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ABSTRACT 
While, politically speaking, China has a centralized government structure with 
strong top-down mandates, under the country’s current fiscal system, local governments 
are responsible for providing most local public goods and services. Large differences in 
economic structures and revenue bases exist, however, causing the implicit tax rate and 
fiscal burdens in support of local government functions to vary significantly across 
jurisdictions. Regions initially endowed with a broader nonfarm tax base do not need to 
rely heavily on new and existing firms to finance public goods provision, which creates a 
healthy investment environment in support of nonfarm sector growth. In contrast, local 
governments in regions where agriculture is the major economic activity spend the 
majority of their resources on their own operating costs, leaving little for public 
investment. Because of the relatively high transaction costs associated with collecting 
taxes from the agricultural sector, local governments tend to levy the existing nonfarm 
sector heavily, thereby greatly inhibiting its growth. As a result, regional differences in 
economic structures and fiscal dependent burdens may translate into widening gaps in 
equality.   iv  5
“All nations have endeavoured, to the best of their judgment, to render their taxes as 
equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both in the time 
and in the mode of payment, and in proportion to the revenue which they brought to  the 
prince, as little burdensome to the people.” 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND POLITICAL 







In the past two decades, decentralization has become a global trend; however, 
empirical evaluation of the impact of decentralization on growth and distribution in 
developing countries is still in its infancy (Bardhan 2002). Decentralization of 
government powers is generally thought to improve the effective provision of local public 
goods and services because local authorities have better and more detailed knowledge of 
the local conditions and can be better monitored by their constituencies (Dethier 1999; 
Bardhan 2002). Tiebout (1956) argues that under fiscal decentralization and 
interjurisdictional competition, individuals are free to move across locations to find the 
best match with their preferences, which helps to ensure that local public goods are 
provided efficiently. Qian and Roland (1998) emphasize that, in addition to this “sorting 
and matching” role, fiscal decentralization can also serve a disciplinary function in 
preserving market incentives. These theories highlight the positive effects of fiscal 
decentralization and interjurisdictional competition on the efficiency of public goods 
provision. 
Like many developing countries, China has undergone its own process of fiscal 
decentralization.
1 The country’s diversity and sheer size provide a rich laboratory for 
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the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
1 For detailed description of China’s fiscal decentralization, see Tong (1998), Zhang (1999), and World 
Bank (2002).    6
testing the predictions associated with the various theories in the context of development. 
Using provincial data to 1993, Lin and Liu (2000) provide empirical evidence that 
decentralization is conducive to growth; Zhang and Zou (1998), on the other hand, report 
a negative correlation. Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) reach the more optimistic finding 
that decentralization is good not only for growth but also for equity. Using data at more 
micro levels, a few other studies (West and Wong 1995; Park et al. 1996; Knight and Li 
1999) show that decentralization has a negative distributional effect. These studies were 
all based on data to the early 1990s, and it is quite possible that things have changed since 
the implementation of more in-depth fiscal reforms in recent years. More recent data are 
also now publicly available, providing both a longer time series and greater regional 
disaggregation, so this is an opportune time to revisit this issue. 
A recent World Bank study (2002) warns that the fiscal decentralization of the 
mid- to late 1990s could actually exacerbate inequalities in fiscal public spending because 
of imbalance between revenues and responsibilities of local governments. The finding is 
based on case studies undertaken in several counties. For this study, we used 
(nationwide) county-level panel data to more systematically investigate the distributional 
impact of decentralization. To our knowledge, this study is one of the first to use county-
level panel data for China.
2  It also adds to sparse literature on the empirical relationships 
between micro-level fiscal decentralization and public-sector performance in developing 
countries (Bardhan 2002).  
In the sections that follow, we begin by reviewing the major theoretical arguments 
on decentralization, then move to a discussion of the empirical analysis undertaken for 
this study and why our results seemingly contradict the theoretical predictions. We then 
draw conclusions and implications for policy. 
                                                 
2 Shih and Zhang (2004) examine the issue of transfers and subsidies using the same data set.    7
II. THEORETICAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
Much of the literature on fiscal federalism, represented by Tibout (1956) and Qian 
and Roland (1998), focuses on the economic efficiency aspect of market competition. In 
essence, the Tiebout model assumes full factor mobility. Bardhan (2002) comments that 
the assumptions underlying the Tiebout model are often too stringent for developing 
countries. In the case of China, despite the recent lessening of controls over migration, 
obstacles to labor movement—particularly from rural areas to cities—remain. Another 
implicit assumption of the Tiebout model is that local governments are responsive to the 
needs of voters. In China, however, local government officials are not generally elected, 
and their preferences may be inconsistent with those of their constituents. In addition, the 
size of local government is largely determined at the central level, based on criteria that 
have little to do with local needs. All these factors could well disqualify the Tiebout 
model in the context of China. The Qian and Roland (1998) federalism model makes a 
crucial assumption that all regions are identical. This assumption may hold within 
China’s more developed coastal areas—such as Zhejiang Province where many counties 
share similar initial conditions—but regional differences are much larger for China as a 
whole, especially between inland and coastal regions, making this assumption 
inappropriate.  
These theories also do not take into account the transaction costs associated with 
tax collection. As the opening quote of this paper illustrates, Adam Smith regarded 
fairness and economy as fundamental tax collection principles. Regarding collection 
costs, he states explicitly (page 1044):  
Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of 
the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it 
brings into the public treasury of the state. 
In particular, Smith was opposed to levying taxes in cases where the related 
collection costs, in the form of collection agent salaries, consumed a significant share of 
the total revenues raised. In a less perfect world, however, labor migration has associated 
costs, as does tax collection and policy implementation. For all these reasons, the   8
assumptions that underlie the theoretical models discussed above—and hence their 
predictions—may not be valid for China.  
To illustrate this further, suppose there are two regions, A (the coastal region) and 
B (the inland region), and government size is in proportion to total population. Prior to 
fiscal decentralization, Region A is endowed with a larger share of industry, while 
Region B relies on agriculture as its major revenue source; their governmental structures, 
however, are the same.
3 In addition, it is much cheaper, on average, to collect a unit of 
tax from an industrial firm than it is from a rural household, so both regions prefer to levy 
taxes on industrial firms. After decentralization, both regions become responsible for 
collecting their own tax revenues, while fulfilling comparable public service mandates.
4   
The local government in Region A is able to obtain the majority of its revenues 
from firms, given the region’s larger industrial base. Moreover, that industrial base 
creates a high opportunity cost for labor. When there are abundant high paying jobs 
available, the job of collecting taxes from individual households may not be appealing. If 
the cost of collecting taxes from rural households outweighs the resulting revenues 
generated, it is more cost-effective for the local government to forego such taxes and 
make up the lost revenue from other sources. When a region has many local firms, the 
implicit taxation burden on each is comparatively lower, which helps to attract more 
businesses and ultimately increases the region’s tax base. And because the size of the 
government is mainly related to population size rather than economic development, the 
local government in Region A can generate higher net revenues for productive public 
investment. Better infrastructure and a lower tax burden can offset the relatively higher 
labor and land costs in the region, contributing to and enabling a virtuous cycle of 
investment and revenue collection.  
In contrast, in Region B there are few nonfarm enterprises. Because of the lower 
costs associated with collecting tax from firms relative to rural households, existing firms 
                                                 
3 Xu Yong (2003) documents the evolution of administrative units in rural China, showing how excessive 
they are.  
4 Liu and Tao (2004) list a set of central mandates and policy burdens.    9
are prone to be targeted by their local government, leading to excessive taxation and fees. 
Therefore, the implicit industrial tax rate tends to be high, in turn discouraging the entry 
of potential investors and driving away existing businesses, which hinders nonfarm sector 
growth. Moreover, given that in China the size of local governments tends to be 
inflexible and is not tied to local revenues, local governments in poor regions often have 
few resources beyond their operating costs to provide public investment. In particular, 
many local governments in the poor regions have sizable amount of debt (Oi and Zhang 
2004). Low levels and quality of public infrastructure and service often result in an 
unfavorable investment environment. Obviously, it is hard for any businesses to operate 
in areas where roads are unpaved and power supply is unreliable. Consequently, despite 
lower wage rates and land rents, Region B may have the worst investment environment. 
The dominance of agriculture in Region B also increases the average costs of tax 
collection because of the difficulty to collect taxes directly from households.  
All in all, when analyzing fiscal decentralization, the administrative and 
governance structure should also been taken into account (von Braun and Grote, 2002).  
The governance structure, economic structure, and the transaction costs of tax collection 
may influence the effect of fiscal decentralization. Whether the combination of 
heterogeneous revenue-raising mechanisms and homogenous government structures 
under fiscal decentralization will affect growth patterns can only be answered 
empirically.    10
III. EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Since 1993, the China State Statistical Bureau has published China County Public 
Finance Statistical Yearbooks which contain detailed data on revenues, expenditures, 
population, gross value of industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO), and public-sector 
size at the county level. There are over 2,000 rural counties in China, and between 1993 
and 2000 several hundred of them changed their names or boundaries. Efforts were made 
to match these counties, relying mainly on the official declarations of changes posted at 
the web site of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Tibet is excluded from the analysis due to 
lack of data. In total, the data includes a panel of 1,860 observations for 1993 and 2000.  
Following Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999), local expenditures were regressed on 
local revenues for both 1993 and 2000 and the coefficient β for revenues was used to 
measure the degree of budget constraints. The larger the value, the greater the budget 
constraint and the more decentralized the fiscal system. The coefficient β increased 
significantly over the (comparatively) short seven-year timeframe, indicating that China’s 
fiscal system had indeed become more decentralized by 2000 (Table 1). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Jian, Qian, and Weingast (1999) and World Bank (2002).  
Table 1.  The Correlations between Local Revenue and Expenditure, 1993 and 
2000 
Regression 1993  2000 





2 0.808  0.812 
Number of observations  1860  1860 
Source: Calculated by author. 
Note: The figures in the parentheses indicate standard errors. Each regression includes a full set of 
prefecture dummies. Tibet is excluded due to missing data. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level.  
To examine the dynamics of regional distribution, the Gini coefficient of per 
capita GVIAO, per capita productive public expenditure (total expenditure minus wage   11
bills and operating costs), and the share of productive investment in total public 
expenditure were calculated based on county-level data (Table 2). All three indicators 
show rising regional disparity. The Gini coefficient of per capita GVIAO rose from 46.47 
in 1993 to 48.39 in 2000, and the density distributions of logarithmic per capita GVIAO 
have clearly expanded over the period (Figure 1). Most noticeably, inequality in the level 
and share of productive investment increased by 7 and 26 percent, respectively, which is 
much higher than the increase in per capita GVIAO.  
Table 2.  Gini Coefficient of Three Indicators, 1993 and 2000 
Year  Per capita GVIAO  Per capita productive 
public expenditure 
Share of productive 
investment in total 
public expenditure 
1993 46.47  68.28  33.04 
2000 48.39  73.34  41.61 
Rate of change (percent)  4.13  7.41  25.94 
Source: Calculated by author from China State Statistical Bureau (various years). 
Note: GVIAO indicates gross value of industrial and agricultural output. 
Figure 1.  The Density Function of Per Capita Gross Industrial and Agricultural 
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To provide more relevant information for policy debates in China, county- level 
public finance data were aggregated into coastal and inland regions.
5  Table 3 presents 
per capita GVIAO, real annual growth of per capita GVIAO, taxation structures, the 
fiscal dependent burdens for the two regions, and land revenues per capita in 1993 and 
2000. The agricultural tax rate in the third column is defined as the ratio of agricultural 
tax revenues to gross agricultural output value, while the implicit industrial rate is 
measured as the ratio of tax revenues from the industrial sector relative to the gross 
industrial output value. The fiscal dependent burden is defined as the number of public 
employees (Bianzhi) per 10,000 yuan (1993 value) of local revenue. Land values increase 
as a region industrializes and urbanizes, creating room for local governments to capture 
the rent (Zhang, Mount, and Boisvert 2004). As a result, many local governments use 
land as a source of revenue (Oi and Zhao 2004). Here we define land revenues as a ratio 







tax rate (yuan 
per 100 yuan) 
Industrial tax 
rate (yuan per 
100 yuan) 
Fiscal burden      
(public employee 
per 10,000 yuan) 
Land rent    
(yuan per 
capita) 
1993          
Coastal region  6,062   0.81  2.74  1.33  4.50 
Inland region  2,050   1.15  5.95  2.41  2.60 
National total   3,569   0.99  3.67  1.86  3.32 
2000         
Coastal region  7,876   1.06  0.80  1.83  8.01 
Inland region  2,646   1.72  1.30  3.54  3.89 
National total   4,612   1.40  0.94  2.67  5.44 
Annual growth rate (percent)  
Coastal region  3.81 3.83  –16.07 4.75  8.60 
Inland region  3.71 5.90  –19.48 5.64  5.95 
National total   3.73 5.06  –17.63 5.28  7.33 
Source: Calculated by the author from China State Statistical Bureau (various years).  
Note: GVIAO indicates gross value of industrial and agricultural output. Annual per capita GVIAO 
growth, per capita land rent, and fiscal burden data were calculated using a comparable national 
GDP deflator and a base year of 1993. 
                                                 
5 The coastal zone includes the provinces Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi and the three directly administered cities, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai; the inland 
zone comprises the remaining provinces.  Kanbur and Zhang (1999, 2005) use the same classification.    13
of city construction taxes and land user fees relative to total population. We used the 
national GDP deflator (1.977) to adjust the growth rates of per capita GVIAO, per capita 
land revenue, and fiscal dependent burden to ensure comparability between the two years.  
Several features are apparent from Table 3. First, although the data for both 
regions indicate substantial growth, the coastal region grew faster (3.81 percent compared 
with 3.71 percent per year in the inland region), confirming a widening regional gap. 
Second, the tax rates in both the agricultural and rural industrial sectors are regressive, 
consistent with the finding of Lin et al. (2002), meaning that the more affluent coastal 
region benefits from lower tax rates compared with the less-developed inland region. 
Third, the coastal region gains greater benefit from rising land values, such that the local 
revenues derived from the city construction tax and land development are much higher 
there than they are in the inland region. In turn, the more developed coastal region 
attracts greater investment and more migrants because of its lower industrial tax rate, so 
land values are further enhanced. Fourth, the fiscal burden of supporting the local 
government is unevenly distributed across regions. The number of people on the public 
payroll per unit of local revenue in the coastal region is almost twice that of the inland 
region. Moreover, the ratio increased for all the regions between 1993 and 2000, 
indicating an expansion of government size. In particular, the enlargement of bureaucracy 
has been faster in the inland than in the coastal regions.  
The implicit industrial tax rate against the logarithmic per capita GVIAO in 1993 
and 2000 is presented in Figure 2. The downward straight line in the figure once again 
clearly demonstrates that the industrial tax rate is regressive. The richer a county is, the 
lower its industrial tax rate. Further, land revenue is positively correlated with the level of 
economic development (Figure 3), which is consistent with the results for the two regions 
shown in Table 2. Wealthier regions are able to capitalize from rising land values to a 
greater extent than poor regions.    14



















Source: Calculated by the author from China State Statistical Bureau (various years). 
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Graphs by year  15
China’s government structure can be characterized as a replicate hierarchy. The 
provincial governments replicate the ministerial structure of the central government while 
the county and prefecture government replicate the provinces.  Apart from the rather 
homogenous governance structure, local governments also share the same central 
mandates.  The main priorities include collecting taxes; maintaining social order; and 
implementing goals, such as agricultural industrialization and urbanization, determined at 
higher levels.  As a result, the government size has little to do with the local economic 
development level. Rather, it is more correlated to the need of central mandates and the 
size of population. Figure 4 plots the relationship between the number of bureaucratic 
positions and the size of local population in 1993 and 2000.  There indeed exists a strong 
linear correlation between these two. Therefore, the regional fiscal burden to support the 
bureaucracy is uneven.  
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Figure 5 further highlights a negative correlation between fiscal dependent 
burdens and economic development, indicating that the revenue capacity in support of the 
public payroll is much weaker in poor counties than in more developed ones.  In poor 
regions, the local government has few financial resources beyond its operating costs to be 
able to provide public goods and services.  












Source: Calculated by the author from China State Statistical Bureau (various years). 
The uneven regional development in nonfarm activities in the rural sector has 
been cited as the major driver of increased rural inequality (Rozelle 1994; Fan, Zhang, 
and Zhang 2004). Wan, Lu, and Chen (2003) and Zhang and Fan (2004) further show that 
the growing regional disparity in public capital significantly contributes to rising regional 
inequality in nonfarm development, largely because public capital is needed to 
complement private capital. Without basic infrastructure in place, such as electricity and 
roads, it is hard for industrial firms to operate. The evidence here offers an additional 
explanation: regions with higher implicit industrial tax rates have more difficulty   17
attracting capital inflows than those with lower tax rates, which causes more 
fragmentation in capital markets and higher regional disparity.   
In short, the descriptive analysis shows that along with fiscal decentralization, regional 
public finance distribution—particularly in terms of productive public spending—has greatly 
deteriorated, contrary to the observations of Jin, Qian, and Weingast (1999) to 1992. These 
results appear to be inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of Tiebout (1956) and Qian and 
Roland (1998); hence, more thorough quantitative examination on the impact of decentralization 
is considered in the next section. 
Quantitative Evidence Based on County Data 
A more quantitative method is now used to examine the impact of existing 
economic structure and fiscal dependent burdens on subsequent local economic growth. 
Following Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) on growth convergence, the growth rate of per 
capita GVIAO is modeled as a function of its initial value, initial economic structure, and 
fiscal dependent burdens, along with a set of other variables: 
  i t
it
it D Z y a y
y ε β + + + + = −
−
δ γ ) log( ) log( 1
1
, (1) 
where  yit is per capita GVIAO. The subscripts t and t-1 refer to 2000 and 1993, 
respectively. The variable on the left-hand side represents the growth rate of per capita 
GVIAO over the period. The coefficient β stands for the speed of convergence of per 
capita GVIAO. The coefficient provides useful information as to how initial conditions 
contribute to long-term growth and whether or not there is convergence. A negative value 
indicates convergence, while a positive value indicates divergence. Because of 
diminishing returns to capital, in a perfect market the returns to capital and labor equalize 
across regions, creating convergence. Z includes the share of gross value of agricultural 
output in GVIAO and the ratio of public employee to total local revenue. These two 
variables are in logarithmic form. γ is the corresponding coefficient for the two variables. 
D is a set of dummy variables. If a county is nationally designated as poor, it is assigned a 
value of 1; otherwise it is assigned a value of zero. In different specifications, prefecture   18
(an administrative unit between the provincial and country levels in China) and provincial 
fixed effects are also included. δ is a vector of coefficients for these fixed effects.  
Table 4 reports regression results under four specifications. The first three 
regressions include prefecture-, provincial-, and regional-level fixed effects, respectively. 
The last column excludes any dummy variables. The second-last row presents the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) for model selection. The model with the smallest 
value is preferred. The AIC criterion suggests that the first regression with the prefecture-
level fixed effects dominates the other three. Because county-specific price information is 
not available, fixed prefecture-level effects serve as a proxy to eliminate the price effect 
inherent in the nominal growth of per capital GVIAO over the period. Moreover, these 
fixed effects may capture other shocks common within prefectures in China.  
Table  4.  The Effect of Initial Economic Structure and Government Size on 
Economic Growth, by Regression 
Variables  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3  Regression 4








Economic structure, 1993 









Fiscal dependent burdens, 1993 
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Regional dummies  Prefecture** Province**  Region**  None 
Omission variable test (p-value)  0.336  0.037  0.086  0.046 
Akaike’s information criterion  1,681.5 2,220.1  2,598.8  2,653.1 
Adjusted R
2  0.536 0.290  0.117  0.090 
Source: Calculated by author. 
Note: Coefficients for dummies are not reported. Figures in parentheses indicate standard errors. ** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The table also presents the p-values of the regression specification error test 
(RESET) for omitted variables. Only the first specification with prefecture dummies   19
accepts the null hypothesis that there are no missing variables. The other three 
regressions all reject the null hypotheses, so the first specification is preferred.  
The coefficient for the initial value of per capita GVIAO in all the regressions is 
negative, suggesting the existence of a mean convergence. The coefficient for the share 
of agricultural output in the initial year, 1993, is statistically significant in these 
regressions, indicating that the heterogeneous economic structure offsets divergence. For 
a region primarily relying on agricultural revenues, the subsequent growth in productive 
spending is slower than a region endowed with a large nonfarm tax base.  
The negative and significant coefficient for the fiscal dependent variable in 1993 
suggests that oversized bureaucracy can encumber local economic growth in poor 
regions. In an ideal (Tibout) world where local governments are responsive to the needs 
of constituents, lower revenues mean smaller government. But in China, government size 
is largely inflexible, creating heavier burdens in the poorer regions relative to the richer 
ones under the current system of fiscal decentralization.  
Table 4 also shows the counties that are nationally designated as poor are growing 
more slowly than other counties. This is consistent with the findings by Fan, Zhang, and 
Zhang (2004) on the performance of China’s poverty alleviation program. There are 
several possible explanations for this. First, local governments in poor countries may be 
more likely to understate their performance indicators so as to retain their poverty status 
and qualify for transfers. Second, in the presence of central transfers, local officials may 
spend more time building connections with the higher levels of government rather than 
developing their local economies.  
The coefficients for the dummy variables are not presented in the table to save 
space, but they are jointly significant in the first three specifications. In the third 
specification, the coefficient for the inland coefficient is statistically negative. Table 5 
lists the separate regression results for the coastal and inland regions indicate that, with 
the exception of the economic structure variable, the coefficients for other variables can 
be considered robust (Table 5). Within prefectures in a coastal region, the economic   20
structure is more homogenous. This is probably why the coefficient for this variable in 
the first regression is insignificant.  
Simply put, fiscal decentralization may erode distributional equity across regions 
when economic structures differ and local governments are excessively large.  
Table  5.  The Effect of Initial Economic Structure and Government Size on 
Economic Growth, by Region 
Variables Coastal  region  Inland 








Fiscal dependent burdens, 1993 (number of employees on the public 










2  0.690 0.580 
Source: Calculated by author. 
Note: Coefficients for prefecture dummies are not reported. Figures in the parentheses indicate 
standard errors. ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.   21
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Considering the sheer size of China, fiscal decentralization is a must in tackling 
the information and incentive problems inherent in the relationship between central and 
local governments. Nevertheless, decentralization is a complex process involving not 
only fiscal aspects but also governance and mandates. When the size of government is 
largely determined independently of the needs of constituencies, the standard Tiebout 
sorting model no longer applies. Under the current fiscal arrangements between China’s 
central and local governments, large regional variation in production patterns and revenue 
structures also makes the underlying assumption of the Qian and Roland (1998) fiscal 
federalism model invalid. Moreover, the transaction costs of tax collections become a 
more serious issue under fiscal decentralization. The high collection costs of agricultural 
taxes combined with the excessive size of local government means that in regions where 
agricultural production dominates, local governments struggle to provide the minimum 
level of basic public goods and services. Farmers and firms in poor regions pay heavy tax 
burdens, while those in the more highly developed (and thereby wealthier) regions 
benefit from more substantial public service provision  and lower tax burdens. The 
regressive nature of the rural taxation system goes a long way toward explaining the 
divergent regional growth patterns, even after controlling for the initial value. Overall, 
fiscal decentralization favors wealthy locations, exacerbating the gap in equity across 
regions.  
In his famous article, Oates (1968) argued that to ensure the functioning of fiscal 
federalism, the central government should maintain oversight of stabilization and 
distribution, while the local government’s predominant role should be allocation, that is, 
the more efficient provision of public goods and services. In the case of China, however, 
the local government performs the functions of both distribution and allocation, such that 
achieving fiscal equality across regions is virtually impossible given the country’s 
diversity.  
The rigid structure and size of local governments in China is another major 
impediment. Without significant reductions to the size of local government— especially   22
in areas where agriculture is the major revenue source—fiscal decentralization alone will 
be insufficient to address the distributional problem associated with decentralization. 
Most theories on federalism assume that local government size and the services provided 
are determined in response to the needs of local residents. In a democratic society, voters 
endogenously determine local government size. Under the current system in China, 
however, local governments in less-developed regions are more likely to expand if they 
are given authority to determine staffing levels. Public employment is a particularly 
attractive option in regions where job opportunities in the nonfarm sector are scarce, and 
this could encourage rent-seeking behavior on the part of officials in terms of their hiring 
relatives and friends. This is even more likely when constituents have little say in local 
affairs. Therefore, reducing and controlling the size of local government under the current 
political system poses a dilemma for policymakers. Economic decentralization during the 
reform period undoubtedly contributed to China’s growth, but given the central political 
regime, regional disparities have widened significantly. Hence, successfully achieving 
balanced regional growth under these conditions is a delicate undertaking. Considering 
China’s past successes in engineering institutional innovations, it is hoped that this new 
challenge will induce further innovations related to fiscal decentralization and 
governance.   23
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